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THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES
POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA: A
MACHIAVELLIAN DILEMMA
The deterioration in relations between the United States and Nica-
ragua over the past five years presents important implications for
international law. Nicaragua claims that recent United States' ac-
tions in Nicaragua violate specific norms of international law and
behavior. The United States maintains that its actions are legal
under international principles of collective self-defense. This Com-
ment focuses on these conflicting claims and applies the relevant
rules of international law in order to determine what violations of
international law, if any, have occurred.
INTRODUCTION
"[T]here are two methods of fighting, the one by law, the other by
force: the first method is that of men, the second of beasts; but as the
first method is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the
second.""
On the night of February 25, 1984, two Nicaraguan fishing trawl-
ers were damaged by explosive devices as they entered the harbor of
El Bluff, Nicaragua. In the following month eight more Nicaraguan
and foreign commercial vessels were damaged by underwater mines
in Nicaraguan waters.' Although no ships were destroyed and no one
was killed, the minings did result in the cancellation of shipments
and the curtailment of normal maritime commerce to and from
Nicaragua.4
Responsibility for the minings was originally attributed to contra
guerrillas based in Honduras.5 It, soon became apparent, however,
I. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1513), reprinted in W. EBENSTEIN, GREAT
POLITICAL THINKERS 296 (1969).
2. For more detailed accounts of the mining incident, see generally Explosion
over Nicaragua, TIME, Apr. 23, 1984 at 16; L.A. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at 1.
3. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2.
4. Id. at 17.
5. Contra is the name given to the guerrilla forces currently engaged in fighting
the Nicaraguan government. Many of the contras were members of the National Guard
under the previous Somoza regime. As early as January 8, 1984, contra officials an-
nounced they were mining Nicaraguan ports to prevent the arrival of weapons from
Cuba and the Soviet Union. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 19.
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that the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), was involved in the planning and funding of the operation.6
World opinion was critical of the United States.7 On March 30,
1984, Nicaragua introduced a resolution in the United Nations Se-
curity Council denouncing the United States for the escalation of
military aggression against Nicaragua.8 The United States vetoed
the resolution but only after all the members of the Council, except
Britain, voted in favor of the resolution.9
On April 6, 1984, the United States announced that it would not
accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
over disputes involving Central America for the next two years.10
The move was made in response to information indicating that Nica-
ragua was preparing to bring the mining dispute to the ICJ.11 Nica-
ragua did institute proceedings against the United States in the ICJ
on April 9, 1984.12 Nicaragua's complaint stated that the United
States' use of force against Nicaragua, and its intervention in Nica-
ragua's internal affairs, violated Nicaraguan "sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence" and was contrary to "univer-
sally accepted principles of international law."13
The recent actions and policies of the United States toward Nica-
ragua reflect a Machiavellian approach to international relations.
The United States has opted to use force rather than international
6. The scope of the United States' involvement in the mining of Nicaragua's
harbors became public in an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal on April 6,
1984: "The Reagan administration's role in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors is larger
than previously disclosed, according to sources who say that units operating from a ship
controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency in the Pacific participated in the opera-
tion." Rogers, U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly is Larger Than
First Thought, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
7. The Soviet Union accused the United States of "piracy" after a Soviet tanker
was damaged on March 20, 1984. France condemned the mining of Nicaraguan waters
as a serious threat not only to the economic life of the country but also to the "very life
of its inhabitants." Even Great Britain, a United States ally, expressed disapproval of the
mining operations. UN CHRON., vol.XXI, No.4, at 16 (1984). Criticism within the
United States transcended party lines. Senator Barry Goldwater, a conservative, called
the mining "an act of war" and one which violated international law. N.Y. Times, Apr.
II, 1984, at Al, col. 8. On April 10, 1984, the Senate voted 84 to 12 in favor of a
resolution opposing the use of Federal funds to mine Nicaraguan harbors. N.Y. Times,
Apr. I1, 1984, at Al, col. 8.
8. UN Doe. S/16463 of Apr. 4, 1984, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 457, 669 (1984).
9. Countries voting in favor of the resolution were China, Egypt, France, India,
Malta, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper
Volta and Zimbabwe. Great Britain abstained. For an account of the UN debate on this
resolution, see UN CHRON., vol. XXI, No.4, at 3 (1984).
10. For a copy of the letter from United States Secretary of State George Schultz
to Secretary General of the United Nations Javier Perez de Cuellar rejecting ICJ juris-
diction in Central American disputes, see 23 I.L.M. 457, 670 (1984).
1I. N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at Al, col. 2.
12. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1984, at Al, col. 8.
13. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Interim Protection Order of May 10).
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law in resolving the current conflict in Central America. Funding
contra rebels, mining Nicaraguan harbors, and rejecting ICJ juris-
diction are indicative of this policy of force over law. By choosing
such a policy approach, the United States has tacitly condoned a
principle generally regarded as anathema in international law
that might makes right.
Under international law, the United States has certain rights and
remedies which have been triggered by Nicaragua's support of rebel
insurgents in El Salvador. 4 Resorting to the unilateral and unlawful
use of force, however, is not one of them. The lawful method of
resolving the Nicaraguan conflict entails the use of international or-
ganizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization
of American States (OAS). By disregarding these legal channels, the
actions of the United States diminish the effectiveness and credibility
of international law.
This Comment analyzes Nicaragua's claims against the United
States to determine whether the United States' actions in Nicaragua
violate specific norms of international law and behavior. Nicaragua
has publicly denounced the United States as an international out-
law.15 Determining whether such a statement is merely rhetoric de-
pends upon an examination of the substantiality of the claims of
Nicaragua under the current rules of international law. Such a dis-
cussion, however, also requires an inquiry into whether the actions of
the United States are justified under international law. The United
States claims that its actions are legal under principles of collective
self-defense because of Nicaraguan aid to rebel forces attempting to
overthrow the government of El Salvador.
This Comment will further analyze the relevant principles of in-
ternational law and apply them to the facts of this conflict. The rea-
sons for undertaking such a discussion are twofold. First, if the ac-
tions of the United States in Nicaragua violate international law, it
is important to document specific violations in order to prevent fu-
ture recurrences of a similar nature. The announcement by the
14. See infra note 26. The basis of the conflict in Central America evolves from
Nicaraguan funding and support of guerrilla forces attempting to overthrow the govern-
ment of El Salvador. The United States, in backing the government of El Salvador, has
pursued a policy aimed at ending Nicaraguan support of the Salvadoran rebels. The
methods chosen to implement that policy are the subject of this Comment. For more
background on the conflict in El Salvador, see generally Forche, El Salvador: The Next
Vietnam?, 45 PROGRESSIVE 27-29 (1981); Pastor, The Target and the Source: El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua, 5 WASH. Q. 116-127 (1982); and White, Central America: The
Problem That Won't Go Away, N.Y. Times Magazine, July 18, 1982, at 21.
15. See L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
United States on January 18, 1985, that it would boycott the ICJ
proceedings in this case ensures that the legal issues involved will not
be properly adjudicated in a court of law.16 A refusal to appear
before the ICJ, however, does not automatically absolve the United
States of its international obligations. Possible violations of interna-
tional law still have occurred and must be addressed.
Second, the inherent weaknesses of international law and the fre-
quent inability of international organizations to prevent violations
create a need for publicity and documentation. One method of
strengthening international law is to expose wrongdoing and publi-
cize illegal conduct in international affairs. Most countries are sus-
ceptible to the influences of world opinion regarding their character
and conduct. Governments exhibit a certain deference to this influ-
ence and act with some measure of regard for it. Failure to do so
leads to condemnation and isolation. The importance of publicizing
nonconformity in international law was recognized by former Secre-
tary of State Elihu Root who noted: "[I]t remains true and is univer-
sally recognized that the nation which has with it the moral force of
the world's approval is strong, and the nation which rests under the
world's condemnation is weak, however great its material power.' 17
These considerations, Root argued, greatly influence the course of a
states' conduct with regard to the rules of international law. For
Root, the most effective method of enforcing international law was
the "injury which inevitably follows nonconformity to public
opinion."' 8
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The mining of Nicaraguan waters is the most visible event in a
series of recent confrontations between the United States and Nica-
ragua. Relations between the two countries have become increasingly
more hostile since President Reagan took office in 1981. In order to
understand the present situation in Nicaragua, it is necessary to ex-
amine the events which preceded the current conflict.
Pre-1981
For much of this century, Nicaragua has been ruled by authorita-
rian dictators such as Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza and his son Anas-
tasio "Tachito" Somoza.19 Although democratic in name and firmly
16. Id. at 1, col. 3.
17. Root, The Sanction of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 451, 456 (1909).
18. Id. at 456.
19. Valenta, The USSR, Cuba, and the Crisis in Central America, reprinted in
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Should the United States be Prohibited from Mil-
itary Intervention in the Western Hemisphere? H.R. Doc. No. 226, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
290 (1982).
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aligned with the United States, the Somoza regimes were character-
ized by corruption and oppression.20 The younger Somoza, head of
Nicaragua from 1967 to 1979, wielded power and dominated elec-
tions through the use of the National Guard and other political
devices.21
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1970s, however,
anti-Somoza opposition groups began to emerge. One of these, the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN),22 became the leading
opposition group to the Somoza regime. 23 By the late 1970s, opposi-
tion to Somoza's authoritarian rule was widespread. 4 In July 1979,
internal and external factors combined to bring about the downfall
of the Somoza regime. The result was the installation of a new
Marxist government dominated by the Sandinistas.26
The establishment of a Marxist-dominated government in Nicara-
gua has resulted in a shift of influence in Central America. The
United States is no longer the sole, dominant power in the region.
The Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist countries have estab-
lished extensive military, economic, and social ties with Nicaragua.26
One result of these ties is that Nicaragua currently acts as a conduit
for military supplies from communist countries to rebels in El
Salvador.2 7
20. Id.
21. Pezzullo, Intervention in Internal Conflict: The Case of Nicaragua, 13 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 201 (1983).
22. The "Sandinistas," as members of the FSLN are called, derived their name
from a revolutionary hero of the 1930s, Augusto Cesar Sandino. In the 1960s and 1970s,
the Sandinistas evolved into a conglomerate of Marxist and non-Marxist elements united
under an anti-Somoza banner. Valenta, supra note 19, at 291.
23. Id. at 291.
24. Id. at 292.
25. Cuba's Renewed Support for Vidlence in Latin America, Special Report No.
90, U.S. DEP'T OF ST., Dec. 14, 1981.
26. See generally Valenta, supra note 19, at 291.
27. The United States has attempted to provide extensive documentation of Nica-
raguan support of El Salvadoran rebels with release of the so-called "White Paper" on
communist interference in El Salvador. This report indicates that between October 1980
and February 1981, Nicaragua was the staging site for a massive Cuban-directed flow of
arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. Communist Interference in El Salvador, Special Report
No. 80, U.S. DEP'T OF ST., Feb. 23, 1981. The State Department based its report on
documents reportedly captured in 1980 and 1981 from communist rebels in El Salvador.
The veracity of the White Paper has come under criticism from some quarters. See Mc-
Ghee, Foreign Policy by Forgery: The C.I.A. and the White Paper on El Salvador, NA-
TION, Apr. 11, 1981; Kwitny, Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. "White Paper" on Reds in El
Salvador, Wall St. J., June 8, 1981. Other sources, however, have supported the White
Paper's conclusion that Nicaragua is providing support to Salvadoran rebels. The Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives concluded: (1) a
major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other communist coun-
These events have dictated the course of the Reagan administra-
tion's actions in Central America. Underlying the policies of the
United States is the belief that Nicaragua, as a Cuban and Soviet
surrogate, is escalating national ideological struggles and incidents of
terrorism in Central America.2 8 The Reagan Administration believes
that Nicaraguan assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas foreshadows
an overall expansionist plan by communist countries, to impose
Marxist-Leninist principles throughout Central America.2 9 The re-
sponse of the United States, therefore, is to provide additional mili-
tary assistance to other Central American governments and covert
support to exiled Nicaraguan insurgents fighting the Sandinista
government. 30
tries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assistance
of the Sandinistas; (2) the Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua,
some of which are located in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control,
and for logistics to conduct their financial, material and propaganda activities; (3) the
Sandinista leadership sanctions and directly facilitates all of the above functions; and (4)
Nicaragua provides a range of other support activities, including securing transit of in-
surgents to and from Cuba, and assistance to the insurgents in planning their activities in
El Salvador. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, H.R. Doc. No. 122,
98th Cong., Ist Sess. 6. (1983). Sources independent of the United States government
have reached similar conclusions. The Washington Post reported that a small village on
Nicaragua's Pacific coast is being used as a base for smuggling arms to rebel forces in El
Salvador. The report included interviews with anonymous area residents including one
who stated: "I don't get involved in politics, but everyone around here knows they are
carrying the arms to El Salvador." Base for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in
Nicaragua, Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1983 at A29, col. 1. The New York Times re-
ported Western and Latin American diplomats in Nicaragua as confirming that the Nic-
araguan government is sending military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents and op-
erating training camps for them in Nicaragua. Salvador Rebels Still Said to Get
Nicaraguan Aid, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
28. In response to a question about United States aid to El Salvador, President
Reagan, in a March 1981 news conference stated:
What we're doing in going to the aid of a government that asked that aid of a
neighboring country - and a friendly country in our hemisphere - is try to halt
the infiltration into the Americas by terrorists and by outside interference, and
those who aren't just aiming at El Salvador but. . .are aiming at the whole of
Central and possibly later South America and. . .eventually North America.
[W]hat we're doing is trying to stop this destabilizing force of terrorism and
guerilla warfare and revolution from being exported in here, backed by the So-
viet Union and Cuba and those others that we've named.
The President's News Conference of Mar. 6, 1981, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 245,
248 (Mar. 9, 1981).
29. "Very simply, guerrillas, armed and supported by and through Cuba, are at-
tempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the people of El Salvador as part
of a larger imperialistic plan." The President's Address Before the Permanent Council of
the Organization of American States of Feb. 24, 1982, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
222 (Mar. 1, 1982).
30. Covert action has been described as the attempt "to influence the internal
affairs of another nation." The primary characteristic of covert action is its secrecy. See
Fatouros, Covert Intervention and International Law, 1975 PROC. AM. J. INT'L L. 192
(1975).
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1981 to Present
In December 1981, President Reagan signed National Security
Decision Directive 17 authorizing the CIA to recruit, arm, and train,
for military purposes, Nicaraguan exiles hostile to the Sandinista re-
gime.3' The stated purpose of the Directive was to interrupt the flow
of arms from Nicaragua to communist-led rebels in El Salvador.3 2
An accompanying National Security Council document, however,
stated that the CIA would build popular support in Central America
and Nicaragua for an opposition front and "support the opposition
front through formation and training of action teams to collect intel-
ligence and engage in paramilitary and political operations in
Nicaragua." 33
Throughout 1982, the United States-supported contra forces con-
ducted numerous hit-and-run raids into Nicaragua.3 4 The Nicara-
guan government claimed that as a result of these raids, 114 Ni-
caraguans were killed in 1982 by the contras.3 5 In addition, the
contra forces increased in number from approximately 500 in De-
cember 1981 to almost 7,000 by May 1983.38 Evidence that the con-
tra forces were actively seeking to undermine the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment was provided by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives. In a report released on
May 13, 1983, the committee concluded that the support and train-
ing of anti-Sandinista insurgents by the United States was aimed not
only at preventing arms shipments to El Salvador, but also at over-
throwing the Nicaraguan government.3 7
31. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 1, at 18.
32. Id.
33. Nicaragua's Sovereignty and Independence Should Not be Jeopardized by
Military Activities, International Court of Justice Declares, UN MONTHLY CHRON., VOL.
21, No. 4, at 7.
34. For press reports concerning the United States support for covert military
action against and within Nicaragua, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1981, at 1, col. 2; N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 5; A Secret
War in Nicaragua, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1982, at 42-53.
35. UN MONTHLY CHRON., supra note 32, vol. 4, at 8.
36. Id.
37. The activities and purposes of the anti-Sandinista insurgents ultimately
shape the program. Their openly acknowledged goal of overthrowing the
Sandinistas, the size of their forces and efforts to increase such forces, and fi-
nally their activities now and while they were on the Nicaraguan-Honduran bor-
der, point not to arms interdiction, but to military confrontation. As the num-
bers and equipment of the anti-Sandinista insurgents have increased, the
violence of their attacks on targets unrelated to arms interdiction has grown, as
has the intensity of the confrontations with Sandinista troops.
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st
Despite the recommendation of the Intelligence Committee that
support to the contras be terminated, 38 the United States' involve-
ment in Nicaragua increased in 1983. 39 In September of that year,
President Reagan approved a plan calling for expansion of the con-
tra forces to between 12,000 and 15,000 men.40 In a report to the
Senate and House Intelligence Committees, the President empha-
sized the importance of destroying vital economic installations and
inflicting harm on the Nicaraguan government.4' Soon after, a series
of attacks on important Nicaraguan facilities began. On September
8, 1983, contra forces severely damaged oil storage and pipeline facil-
ities at Puerto Sandino on Nicaragua's Pacific coast. 42 In October,
oil storage facilities at Benjamin Zeledon and Corinto were attacked,
resulting in the loss of some three and a half million gallons of gaso-
line and diesel fuel.43
In November 1983 Congress enacted new legislation which appro-
priated an additional $24 million to finance "covert activities" in
Nicaragua.44 The stated purpose of the legislation, which President
Reagan signed on December 8, 1983, was to support "directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. 45 Dur-
ing 1983, Nicaragua claimed that contra forces killed 1,030 Ni-
Sess, at 11 (1983). The report further stated: "If there ever was a formula for U.S.
policy failure in Central America, it would involve two elements: (1) acts that could be
characterized as U.S. interventions in Nicaragua; and (2) an alliance with the followers
of Somoza. Both characteristics can now be made." Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4. On July 27 and 28, 1983, the House of Representatives debated
whether to enact legislation terminating United States support for the contra forces. The
House voted 228 to 195 in favor of terminating funds to the contras. 129 CONG. REc.
H5881-82 (July 28, 1983). The measure, however, was defeated in the Senate.
39. In a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives the Chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Boland, commented on the
increased activity:
The most alarming change has been the expansion of the war in Nicaragua
.... It is now an air and sea war. Insurgents have engaged in bombing raids
on Nicaragua cities, airports, and harbors. Targets have been economic, such as
the oil storage tanks in Corinto and the electrical generating plant and oil pipe-
line in Puerto Sandino.
129 CONG. REc. H8390 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Boland).
40. UN MONTHLY CHRON., supra note 32, at 9.
41. Id. at 9.
42. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at 12, col. 1.
43. Id. For a more detailed account of these CIA supported operations, see L.A.
Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
44. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, re-
printed in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (97 Stat.) 1473.
45. Section 108 of the Act provides:
During fiscal year 1984, not more than $24,000,000 of funds available to the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or
entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or
expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly
or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation,
group, organization, movement, or individual.
Id. at 1475.
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caraguans and wounded another 1,323.4"
The conflict in Nicaragua further escalated in March of 1984.
While Nicaraguan and foreign vessels were being damaged by un-
derwater mines, contra forces launched coordinated attacks from
Honduras and Costa Rica into Nicaragua.47
The furor following disclosure of CIA involvement in the mining
of Nicaraguan waters was followed by widespread criticism of the
United States for rejecting ICJ jurisdiction in the Nicaraguan pro-
ceeding. 48 Nicaragua's application to the ICJ included a request to
the Court to initiate provisional measures for interim protection
pending the final resolution of the proceedings. 49 The ICJ held hear-
ings in late April of 1984 to consider Nicaragua's complaint and the
United States' request that the case be dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds. 50
46. UN MONTHLY CHRON., supra note 33, at 9.
47. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 16.
48. Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda Amor called the mining of
Nicaraguan ports illegal under international law and stated: "It is not valid to decide in a
unilateral, arbitrary and discriminatory form that the international judicial norms do not
apply to a state because this same state has decided that these are not applicable." N.Y.
Times, Apr. 14, 1984, at A6, col. 3. Reaction within the United States was sharply di-
vided. Senator Jesse Helms argued that the United States should not, as a general rule,
accept the jurisdiction of the World Court in matters affecting national security. 130
CONG. REC. S4193 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1984) (statement of Sen. Helms). Senator Ken-
nedy, meanwhile, warned that in rejecting jurisdiction, the United States was threatening
to destroy the effectiveness of the World Court in dealing with cases that the United
States might take to the Court in the future. 130 CONG. REC. S 4145 (daily ed. Apr. 9,
1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
49. Under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, "provisional measures" may be re-
quested when a state considers that the rights which form the subject of its application
are in immediate danger. I.C.J. Statute art. 41, reprinted in I. BROWNLIE. BASIC DOcu-
MENTS IN INT'L LAW, 398 (1983).
50. Although the United States had previously asserted that the ICJ did not havejurisdiction in this matter, it was required under article 36(6) to present arguments sup-
porting its position. Article 36(6) provides that in the event of a dispute as to whether the
Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. The
United States based its position on two grounds. First, Nicaragua had never formally
consented to the Court's jurisdiction; the Court, therefore, lacked the authority to hear
the case. The United States argued that Nicaragua's 1929 declaration purporting to ac-
cept the Court's jurisdiction had never come into force, and no instrument of ratification
had ever been deposited with the League of Nations. Second, the United States' declara-
tion of April 6, 1984 suspended its 1946 declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the Court. See International Court of Justice: United States Recognition of Com-
pulsory Jurisdiction, August 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598. The United
States claimed that the current dispute involved countries other than just Nicaragua and
the United States because Nicaragua's claims were "inextricably related" to the claims
of other Central American states against Nicaragua. Therefore, according to the argu-
ment, those states were "indispensable parties" in whose absence the court could not
properly proceed. The United States further contended that the Contradora process, not
On May 10, 1984, the ICJ unanimously ruled in favor of Nicara-
gua's provisional request that the United States cease mining and
restricting access to and from Nicaragua's ports. The court also
ruled, by a fourteen to one vote, that Nicaragua's right to sover-
eignty and political independence "should be fully respected and not
jeopardized by any military or paramilitary activities."' 51 The Court,
however, did not resolve the question of whether it had jurisdiction
to deal with the merits of the case. It elected to hold further hearings
to decide the jurisdiction question at a later date.52
Hearings on the jurisdiction issue were resumed in October 1984.
The arguments of the United States at these hearings were an ex-
pansion of the position taken in the interim proceedings in April.53
The Court, however, refused to accept this position and voted, fifteen
to one, that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.5 4 Subsequently, the
United States announced that it would boycott any further proceed-
ings in the ICJ dealing with Nicaragua's application. 55
GENERAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Introduction
In order to determine whether the actions of the United States
toward Nicaragua violate international law, it is necessary to under-
stand the general nature and sources of international law. The notion
of a system of international law which guides the relations between
states predates the emergence of nation-states in the Middle Ages.
Philo, a first century philosopher, foresaw the need for legal order
among different states.
The Megalopolis, or Great City, . . . uses a single constitution
and a single law. . . which enjoins what is to be done, and prohibits
what is not to be done. But the variously situated states are unlim-
ited in number and use different constitutions and dissimilar law; for
in the different states various customs and laws have been invented
and enacted.56
the ICJ, was the "properly instituted regional process" to resolve the "current turmoil"
in Central America. I.C.J. Public Sitting, Apr. 27, 1984, at 10:00 A.M., Verbatim Rec-
ord, passim.
51. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Provisional Measures Order of May 10). The lone
dissenting vote was cast by Judge Sehwebel of the United States. In a separate opinion,
Judge Schwebel argued that the Court's emphasis on the rights of Nicaragua alone was
unwarranted and incompatible with the principles of equality of states and of collective
security.
52. Id. at 189.
53. See I.C.J. Public Sitting, supra note 49.
54. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at 1 col. 8.
55. See L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
56. M. SIBLEY. POLITICAL IDEAS AND IDEOLOGIES 163 (1970).
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Philo wrote these words at a time when the earth was considered
to be flat and to extend only marginally beyond the boundaries of
the Roman Empire. His perception of the need for consistent cus-
toms and laws between states, however, remains a basic principle of
modern international law. Philo's reference to a system of interna-
tional law is similar in nature to contemporary formulations. Under
the current international order, international law refers to standards
of conduct and norms of behavior by which states are bound in their
relations with each other.57 Unlike the legal structure in most coun-
tries, international law is not derived from a single source such as a
constitution or a fixed body of rules. There are no universal laws or
statutes governing a particular situation. Rather, international law
derives from many different sources.58
Sources of International Law
The sources of law, from which nearly all current international
conflicts are resolved, are outlined in article 38 of the Statute of the
ICJ:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted at law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.""
Although this provision is generally accepted as enumerating the
fundamental sources of international law, it is not exhaustive. Other
potential sources of international law include decisions and resolu-
57. For similar definitions of international law, see C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (2d rev. ed., 1945) "The term international law may be fairly employed to desig-
nate the principles and rules of conduct declaratory thereof which states feel themselves
bound to observe and, therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with each
other."; J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 1 (4th ed. 1949) "The Law of Nations, or Inter-
national Law, may be defined as the body of rules and principles of action which are
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another."
58. "Sources" refers to the origins of the rules of international law, specifically
the means by which rules of international law are created and their application secured.
"The origins of the rules of international law . . . are the opinions, decisions or acts
constituting the starting-point from which their more or less gradual establishment can
be traced." Corbett, The Consent of States and the Sources of the Law of Nations, 6
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 20, 29 (1925).
59. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1, reprinted in I.
BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1983).
tions of international organizations, unilateral acts of international
law, and the application of the principles of ex aequo et bono.6e
A certain hierarchy exists among the sources of international law.
The most important source is international conventions.61 This term
commonly refers to bilateral and multilateral treaties, but may also
include other types of international agreements.62 Treaties establish
the rules of law to be followed by states as a matter of legal obliga-
tion. As such, they have been analogized to contracts between pri-
vate individuals.63
A second important source of international law is international
custom, which has been defined as the constant and uniform princi-
ples and practices of law followed by states as a matter of obliga-
tion. 4 The relevance of custom to the international sphere is twofold.
First, custom embodies a substantial proportion of international law.
Second, custom, although it may be modified or replaced by treaties
between the states directly involved, constitutes a fixed body of rules
and principles by reference to which treaties must be interpreted in
case of doubt.6 5
A third source of international law is what the ICJ statute terms
"general principles of law." Professor Lauterpacht describes these
principles "as obvious maxims of jurisprudence of a general and fun-
damental character." 6 The importance of these general principles as
a source of international law is exemplified by instances in which
treaties and custom provide no guidance. They permit gaps in inter-
national law to be filled by principles which are common to all, or at
least the vast majority of national systems of law.
The two final sources of law listed in the ICJ statute - judicial
60. Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute provides that the list of sources in article
38(l) "shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto." Equity is not only applied, but allowed to override all other
rules in an ex aequo et bono decision. In this context, equity is used as a synonym for
justice. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44-45
(1980).
61. The importance of treaties as a source of international law is reflected by
their increased usage over the past half century. See Gamble, Multilateral Treaties: The
Significance of the Name of the Instrument, 10 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 1 (1980).
62. Synonyms for treaties, or for particular types of treaties, include agreement,
pact, protocol, charter, statute, act, covenant, declaration, engagement, arrangement, ac-
cord, regulation and provisions. Id. at 30, n.1.
63. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 58 (1970).
64. Id. at 61. Customary international law is evidenced by the executive, diplo-
matic, and judicial decisions of a state. The ICJ provided guidelines for the use of cus-
tom in international law in the Asylum Case. The Court held: "The party which relies on
a custom . . . must prove that this custom is established in such a manner that it has
become binding on the other party ... and that the rule invoked ... is in accordance
with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the states in question." Ayslum Case
(Colum. v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 276 (1950).
65. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 63, at 61.
66. Id. at 69.
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decisions and the teachings of publicists - are not as significant as
the three previously mentioned. These two sources serve "as subsidi-
ary means for the determination of rules of law."16 7 International ju-
dicial decisions, by rule, have no authority outside the case in which
they are rendered.6 8 As a matter of practice, however, the ICJ has
repeatedly invoked and relied upon its own decisions. 69 Conse-
quently, judicial decisions, although not binding, have become a
rather persuasive source of international law.
The last source of international law deserving mention is the acts
of international organizations. Resolutions of the UN General As-
sembly or the General Assembly of the OAS may be considered evi-
dence of customary law because they reflect the views of the states
voting for them.
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE U.S.
NICARAGUA CONFLICT
Treaties
Because of their importance in international law, treaties provide a
logical starting point by which to examine the legality of the United
States' actions in Nicaragua. The United States and Nicaragua are
signatories to several relevant treaties. These treaties provide a
source of guidance, regulation, and authority by which relations be-
tween the two countries are to be governed. Treaties are important
in international law because they allow states to agree, prior to the
inception of a dispute, on peaceful methods of conflict resolution. As
such, treaties are a manifest expression of the parties' intentions.
United Nations Charter
The cornerstone of the UN and the post-World War II legal order
is the prohibition of the use of force contained in article 2(4) of the
UN Charter. That provision states: "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United
Nations. ' 0
67. I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(d).
68. I.C.J. Statute art. 59 provides: "The decision of the court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
69. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE IN-
TERNATIONAL COURT 5-15 (1958).
70. U.N. CHARTER June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
The purpose of article 2(4) was to codify international norms
prohibiting the use of force. Previous attempts to regulate aggressive
behavior in international relations had proven insufficient. The
League of Nations' parallel covenant to article 2(4) stated that
league members were obligated not "to resort to war."' 71 This termi-
nology, however, left unmentioned hostilities which, although violent,
could not be considered war. The drafters of the UN Charter wished
to conclusively resolve the debate as to how much force could be
considered an act of war. Thus, in drafting article 2(4), the term
"war" was discarded and replaced by the phrase "threat or use of
force." This wording was interpreted as prohibiting a broad range of
hostile activities including not only "war" and other equally destruc-
tive conflicts, but also applications of force of a lesser intensity or
magnitude. 2
The unanimous adoption of two General Assembly resolutions has
clarified the scope of article 2(4).7 The first resolution - the Decla-
ration of Friendly Relations - gives a more precise meaning to arti-
cle 2(4). The Declaration describes behavior which constitutes the
unlawful "threat or use of force" and enumerates standards of con-
duct by which states must abide.74 Violation of any of these stan-
dards of conduct is declared to be contravention of article 2(4).7 5
The second resolution - the Definition of Aggression - provides
71. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, June 28, 1919, 2 BEVANS 46, 1919, at
Part I.
72. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 142-43 (1961).
73. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Definition of Aggression,
G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Definition of Aggression].
74. The Declaration on Friendly Relations includes the following provisions:
A war of aggression constitutes a crime against peace for which there is responsibility
under international law. Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of
force to violate the existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of
solving international disputes ....
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organ-
ization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries for incursion
into the territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or partici-
pating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state...
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
No State shall organize, assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive,
terrorist or armed activities towards the violent overthrow of the regime of an-
other State.
75. "By accepting the respective texts [of the Declaration on Friendly Relations],
states have acknowledged that the principles represent their interpretations of the obliga-
tion of the Charter." Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 713, 715 (1971).
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a detailed statement on the meaning of the term aggression which is
defined as "the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in
any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. '1 6
The resolution contains a list of acts which, regardless of a declara-
tion of war, qualify as acts of aggression. 77 The resolution provides
that a state which commits an act of aggression violates interna-
tional law as embodied in the UN Charter. 8
The actions of the United States in Nicaragua appear to fall
within the scope of article 2(4), when interpreted in light of these
resolutions. The illegality of aid to rebel groups such as the contras
has been well established by the UN General Assembly. Both resolu-
tions specifically prohibit the "organizing," "assisting," or "financ-
ing" of "armed bands," "mercenaries," or "terrorists" for the pur-
pose of aggression toward or overthrow of another state.79 According
to one international law scholar, "a state uses force when it sends or
permits the sending of irregular forces or armed groups, including
non-nationals, across the frontier to operate in another state." 80 Sim-
ilar conclusions condemning this type of unlawful use of force have
76. Definition of Aggression, supra note 73, at 142.
77. These include under article 3:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part
thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of an-
other State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State, for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars,
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein.
78. A fundamental purpose of the UN Charter is to "maintain international
peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 1. Article 5(2) of the Definition of
Aggression, supra note 73, provides: "A war of aggression is a crime against interna-
tional peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility."
79. See supra notes 74 and 77.
80. M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 748 (1968).
been expressed by the International Law Commission81 and other
jurists.82
Under article 2(4), the organizing, arming, training, and financing
of contra forces by the United States83 are clearly prohibited activi-
ties.8 Evidence that the United States is involved in these activities
is provided by the Congressional appropriation, in November of
1983, of $24 million in covert aid to contra forces.85 The House In-
telligence Committee described such covert aid as providing encour-
agement and support "to Nicaraguan exiles to foster insurgency
within Nicaragua."8 While President Reagan has portrayed the
contras as "freedom fighters, 87 Senator Kennedy has described con-
tra activities as terrorism.88 Under international law, acts of terror-
81. The International Law Commission described as an offense against peace,
"the organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a
State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the
territory of another state . . . ." 45 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 128 (1951).
82. Professor Fawcett describes the nature of unlawful intervention:
The entry into or presence in the territory of another state of governmental units or
self-organized armed bands constitute, in so far as they are not permitted by the United
Nations Charter, a violation of the territorial integrity of that state;
The use of force by such units or bands, for the purpose of "subverting the
will of the people" and weakening or overthrowing the established political order
of another state, is an act against the political independence of that state con-
trary to Article 2(4);
A state will be using such force in so far as it sends these units or bands
across, or encourages or tolerates their crossing the frontier, or assists them
when they are already in the territory of the other state.
Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103
RECUEIL DES COuRS, 347, 359 (1961 Vol. II).
83. According to the Washington Post, over $80 million has been spent since
1981 in funding the contras. For an account of the CIA's role in supporting the contras,
see Dickey & Cody, The CIA and Its Not-So Secret War, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed.,
Dec. 31, 1984, at 9-10.
84. An example of the type of activity prohibited by article 2(4) occurred in post-
World War II Greece. Rebel forces fighting the Greek government were being furnished
with both military aid and the use of territory for military bases by Albania, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia and Romania. The United States condemned such activities as violating "the
territorial integrity and political independence of Greece." 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 734 (1971). McDougal and Feliciano cite the Greek situation to
support their position that such "indirect aggression" violates article 2(4): "[A] govern-
ment which gives military aid to groups which commit armed subversive or terrorist ac-
tivities against another state by financing, organizing, training, or supplying them with
arms or material, vicariously engages in the illegal use of force." Id. at 737. See also
Fawcett, supra note 82, at 359.
85. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
86. PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, H.R. Doc. No. 122, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1983).
87. Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
650 (May 4, 1983).
88. In a debate on the Senate floor, Senator Kennedy produced the affidavit of an
American priest living in Nicaragua, recounting incidents of violence by contras aimed
at Nicaraguan civilians. The incidents included the murdering, raping, and beating of
civilians and burning of Nicaraguan villages. Senator Kennedy stated: "I do not see how
anyone could label that kind of activity as anything but terrorism .... 130 CONG.
910
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ism are indisputable violations of article 2(4). s9
The presence of rebel forces, which promote insurgency within the
borders of another country, in past instances has been determined to
be a violation of the UN Charter. For example, following World
War II, several thousand dissident Chinese nationalist soldiers re-
mained in Burma.9 ° Burma brought the problem to the UN. The
General Assembly found the presence of the nationalist forces con-
trary to the UN Charter and "violative of the territory and sover-
eignty of the Union of Burma." 9' 1 The UN demanded that the for-
eign forces disarm and either agree to internment or to leave
Burma's territory. 92
More recent examples of the illegal use of force across interna-
tional borders include the United States-sponsored invasion of Gua-
temala in 1954 and the Bay of Pigs incident in 1961 .9 Both events
are comparable in many respects to the current situation in Nicara-
gua. The 1954 invasion of Guatemala was a CIA operation aimed at
overthrowing the leftist government of Jacobo Arbenz.9 ' As in the
present Nicaraguan conflict, Honduras was used as a base of opera-
tions for the armed units. In response to the invasion, Guatemala
appealed to the UN Security Council to "put a stop to the aggres-
sion in progress against it."9 5 The Security Council adopted a resolu-
tion urging an end to the hostilities and calling on members to re-
frain from assisting the belligerents.96 When the United States-
REC. S4149 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). For further accounts
of unlawful contra violence, see Barger, The Story of the Guerrilla Manual Reveals
Atrocities by Rebels, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Nov. 12, 1984, at 17; and Rosenberg
& Yozell, Nicaragua 1984: The Clash Between Progressive Revolution & United States
Violations of International Laws, 13 IMMIGRATION NEWSLETTER Vol. 5-6, at 4 (1984).
89. Article 2(6) of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, prepared by the International Law Commission, prohibits "[tihe undertaking
or encouragement by the authorities of a state of terrorist activities in another state, or
the toleration by the authorities of a state of organized activities calculated to carry out
terrorist acts in another state." 45 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 128 (1951).
90. 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (1971).
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
93. M. SORENSEN, supra note 80, at 748. Sorenson claims a state uses force when
it sends or permits the sending of irregular forces or armed groups across borders to
operate in other states. "Contemporary history abounds in examples of this type of the
use of force: the invasion of Guatemala ... in 1954; the invasion of Cuba - the Bay of
Pigs incident - 1961." Id.
94. Carto, The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International Law, Unilateral
Policy, or Atavistic Anachronism?, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 203, 215 (1981).
95. Nanda, The United States Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
World Order - Part I1, 44 DEN. L.J. 225, 247 (1967).
96. Id. at 247-248.
supported insurgents continued fighting in violation of the resolution,
Guatemala renewed its appeal to the Security Council. This time,
the Security Council debate on the incident was blocked by the
United States. 97 Subsequently, the coup successfully toppled the
Arbenz government and installed a dictatorship. The Security Coun-
cil, in adopting the resolution, acted within the scope of its power
under article 39 of the UN Charter to determine the existence of an
"act of aggression.""" The action of the Security Council signified
that the United States-supported invasion was an act of aggression
in violation of the UN Charter.
An incident similar to the Guatemala situation developed in April
1961 when approximately 1,400 Cuban exiles, organized and di-
rected by the CIA, launched an amphibious invasion of Cuba at the
Bay of Pigs.99 The operation, however, was a failure and the exiles
were quickly forced to surrender.100 As in the Guatemala incident,
the U.N. adopted a resolution calling on the parties to "abstain from
any action which may aggravate existing tension."' 0'11 Although it
was not specifically condemned in the resolution, the complicity of
the United States in supporting the Cuban exiles was tacitly viewed
as an act of aggression. 0 2
In both of these situations, as in Nicaragua today, the United
States organized and financed the invasion of another country by
forces committed to overthrowing a legally recognized government.
According to the terms of the UN resolutions on aggression and
friendly relations, and based on UN practice, siuch conduct is imper-
missible under article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 0 3
Charter of the Organization of American States
The OAS is an international regional organization consisting of
twenty-eight member countries in the Western Hemisphere.104
97. Akenhurst, Enforcement Action by Regional Agencies, With Special Refer-
ence to the Organization of American States, 42 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 175, 181 (1967).
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
99. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1961, at 1.
100. Rowles, The United States, The OAS, and the Dilemma of the Undesirable
Regime, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 385, 397 (1983).
101. id.
102. In a speech before the American Society of International Law, Professor
Wright reflected on the Bay of Pigs incident: "If the United States was guilty of complic-
ity in the departure of a military expedition from its territory or its leased islands, it was
guilty of 'aggression.' Aggression includes government complicity in, or toleration of, the
passage from its territory with hostile intentions of a military expedition or enterprise."
Wright, Intervention and Cuba in 1961, PROC. AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 17 (1961).
103. "[A]s was clear in both the Guatemala and the Bay of Pigs cases, such sup-
port of armed paramilitary attacks against Nicaragua constitutes a flagrant violation of
article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter .... " Rowles, supra note 100, at 403. See
also M. SORENSEN supra note 80, at 748.
104. Baum, The Organizations of American States, 1981 SAO PAULO CONFER-
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Formed in 1948, the OAS was designed to provide a forum for eco-
nomic, political, and social cooperation, and as a means of settling
disputes between its members. 105 Article 18 of the Charter provides:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any
other form of interference or attempted threat against its political, eco-
nomic and cultural elements.106
Article 20 of the Charter further provides that "[t]he territory of a
state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of mili-
tary occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. 1 0 7
The prohibition of intervention by the OAS Charter has its origins
in the Monroe Doctrine. First expressed in a statement by President
James Monroe to Congress in 1823, the Doctrine established the
principle that European states should not interfere in the affairs of
the Western Hemisphere.108  By the twentieth century, however,
Latin American countries were concerned more about intervention
by the United States than by European powers. 0 9 This wariness led
ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE WORLD I. See generally ORGANIZATIONS OF AMERICAN
STATES. A HANDBOOK (1977).
105. Baum, supra note 104, at 1.
106. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CHARTER, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 15,
21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 [hereinafter cited as OAS CHARTER]. References in
the text to provisions of the OAS Charter are to the numbers of such articles currently in
force under the revised OAS Charter. Note that former articles 15 and 17 are now arti-
cles 18 and 20. The OAS Charter is reprinted in F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, & OTHER DOCUMENTS pt. 2, 425-32
(1983).
107. OAS CHARTER, art. 20.
108. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more imme-
diately connected .... The political system of the [European] powers is essen-
tially different ... from that of America .... [W]e should consider any at-
tempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety.
Annual message to Congress, A.M. STATE PAPERS, 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS 250 (Dec.
2,1823), reprinted in 6 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (1906).
109. For a time, the Monroe Doctrine was used as a justification for United States
intervention in Latin American affairs. "As the United States emerged as a world power
in the years prior to World War I, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded and reinterpreted
to justify the assertion of U.S. power in Latin America." Carto, supra note 94, at 207.
This was manifested in President Theodore Roosevelt's message to Congress on Decem-
ber 6, 1904:
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the
ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require inter-
vention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, of the United
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence,
to the adoption in 1933 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of
States. 110 This Convention formally prohibited intervention in the af-
fairs of Latin American countries.""' The principle of non-interven-
tion enunciated by the convention became the basis of articles 18
and 20 of the OAS Charter.112
Articles 18 and 20 constitute an extensive, broadly worded prohi-
bition of unilateral and collective acts of intervention." 3 Their lan-
guage barring intervention, whether "direct or indirect," encom-
passes situations in which a state uses its own military forces and
those where the state makes use of a surrogate or mercenary force.
Furthermore, the Charter reemphasizes the doctrine of territorial in-
violability by forbidding, even temporarily, the military occupation
of another country.11 4
The draft of a resolution currently under consideration by the
OAS General Assembly demonstrates the comprehensiveness of
those acts considered contrary to the non-intervention principles con-
tained in the OAS Charter." 5 Under the terms of the resolution, a
violation of the principle of non-intervention would include (although
it is not limited to) the following acts: (1) the concentration of
armed forces or disproportionately large scale military maneuvers
along the border of another state, if the circumstances or the rela-
tionship between those states support an inference of a purpose to
intimidate; (2) naval or air maneuvers carried out in waters adjacent
to those within the jurisdiction of a state, by foreign ships or aircraft,
if motivated by a desire to intimidate; and (3) the organization, sup-
port, promotion, financing, instigation, or tolerance of armed, subver-
of the exercise of an international police power.
J. RICHARDSON, 14 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT
at 6923 (1970).
110. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 29, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097, T.S. No. 881, reprinted in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: TREATIES, CONVEN-
TIONS & OTHER DOCUMENTS, supra note 106, pt. 1 at 81. The principles adopted in the
Convention were the "result of a Latin American obsession with proclaiming an absolute
doctrine of non-intervention and binding every nation in the hemisphere, including the
United States, to adhere." Comment, The United States Action in Grenada: An Exercise
in Realpolitick, 16 INTER-AM. L. 53, 80 (1984).
Ill. Article 8 provides: "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of another." The Convention was ratified by both the United States and
Nicaragua.
112. Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROC. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 72 (1959).
113. The prohibition on illegal collective intervention by two or more countries is
to be distinguished from legitimate "collective action" which arises when the competent
organizations (i.e., the UN, the OAS) authorize intervention measures through a group
of states to maintain international peace and security. See F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra
note 106, at 91.
114. OAS CHARTER art. 20.
115. The "Draft Instrument," as well as the "Statement of Reasons," is contained
in OAS Doc. QEA/SER. G, CP./Doc. 388/74, Dec. 5, 1974, reprinted in F.V. GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 106, at 97.
[VOL. 22: 895, 1985] A Machiavellian Dilemma
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
sive, or terrorist activities that affect another state, participation in a
foreign civil war."" All of these activities violate the broad principles
of non-intervention which form the foundation of the OAS system.
Employing the guidelines set forth in the OAS resolution, the ac-
tions of the United States against Nicaragua violate the OAS Char-
ter.11 7 The support of contra forces attempting to overthrow the Nic-
araguan government constitutes indirect intervention in the affairs of
that country. Under article 20, the mining of Nicaraguan harbors is
an illegal encroachment upon Nicaragua's territorial sovereignty. In
addition, the mining severely impairs the ability of Nicaragua to en-
gage in international trade and commerce.118 This type of economic
interference is prohibited by article 18. Further, the presence of con-
tra forces on both sides of the Nicaragua - Honduras border," 9 the
stationing of United States battleships off of the Nicaraguan
coast,120 and numerous transgressions of Nicaraguan airspace by
United States military planes,' 21 are all considered contrary to non-
intervention principles.
Additional Treaty Obligations
In addition to international multilateral treaties such as the UN
and OAS Charters, the United States and Nicaragua are subject to
the terms of less comprehensive multilateral and bilateral treaties
which have been signed and ratified by the two countries and are
still in force.122
116. F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 106, at 98.
117. This conclusion is supported by many familiar with the situation. In a debate
on the House floor, one Congressman stated: "Appropriating funds with the intention of
overthrowing the legal and recognized government of another member . . . in this case
the Government of Nicaragua, clearly violates the Charter of the O.A.S." 129 CONG.
REC. H8424 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Coyne). "Given the recurrent
reports of United States support for covert military action against and within Nicaragua,
it should be stressed that articles 18 and 20 clearly prohibit any such covert operations."
Rowles, supra note 100, at 391.
118. Commercial vessels from Holland, Panama, and Japan were damaged from
mines planted in the harbors of Corinto and Puerto Sandino. (These two ports handle 96
percent of Nicaragua's shipping activity.) Commercial shipments to and from Nicaragua
were temporarily curtailed during the busiest months of the year. (The coffee and cotton
harvests are ready for export in April and May.) Drinan, C.LA. Faces World Court
Suits, U.S. Faces Resentment for Nicaraguan Harbor Mining, Nat'l Cath. Rep., Apr.
20, 1984, at 1.
119. UN MONTHLY CHRON., supra note 33, at 8.
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id.
122. See generally TREATIES IN FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9351
(1984).
The Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the
Event of Civil Strife12 3 was the first multilateral treaty in the West-
ern Hemisphere to define the permissible conduct of states in the
event of civil strife in another country.124 Article (1) of the conven-
tion forbids the transfer of arms and war material to rebel forces in
other countries "while the belligerency of the rebels has not been
recognized, in which. . . case the rules of neutrality shall be ap-
plied. ' 25 The convention prohibits subversive activities instigated,
organized, or generally financed by "extracontinental powers.' 126
Consequently, the United States has violated its legal obligations
under this convention by supplying arms, ammunition, and war
materials to contra forces engaged in civil strife against Nicaragua.
Five years after the Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights
of States, twenty-five countries, including six in Europe, signed the
Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Saavedra La-
mas Treaty) in Rio De Janeiro.2 7 According to the terms of the
treaty, the contracting parties formally condemned wars of aggres-
sion in their mutual relations. They pledged to settle any disputes or
controversies by employing only pacific means sanctioned by interna-
tional law. The parties agreed that under no circumstances would
they resort to intervention, either diplomatic or armed, as a means of
conflict resolution. 128
The United States has utilized both diplomatic and armed inter-
vention in Nicaragua, and has therefore acted in contravention of
the terms of this treaty. In fact, the actions of the United States
constitute a hybrid of the aforementioned types of intervention. The
term "gunboat diplomacy" has been used to describe United States
foreign policy, which is characterized by diplomatic pressure on the
Sandinista leaders, coupled with continued support of the contra
rebels.1 29 By employing the use of force and armed aggression rather
123. Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil
Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, 48 Stat. 2749, T.S. No. 814 [hereinafter cited as the Convention
Concerning the Duties and Rights of States].
124. Civil strife or civil war has been defined as "an armed struggle by a group or
citizenry against the established order in order to obtain power over its own state." Diab
v. Attorney-General, 1952 INT'L L. REP. 550, 551 (1952).
125. Convention Concerning the Duties and Rights of States, supra note 123, at
art. 1, Third.
126. See F.V. GARCIA-AMADOR, supra note 105, vol. II, at 286.
127. Anti-War Treaty of Aggression and Conciliation, Oct. 10, 1933, 49 Stat.
3363, T.S. No. 906 (also known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty). Nineteen American
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Savador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
United States, Uruguay and Venezuela) and six non-American countries (Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Romania, Spain and Yugoslavia) became parties to the "Saa-
vedra Lamas Pact."
128. Id. at art. III.
129. See generally Reagan's Gunboat Diplomacy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1, 1983, at
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than conciliation, the United States has violated the terms of the
Saavedra Lamas Treaty.
The principle of non-intervention among American states was for-
mally adopted in 1933 in the Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States.130 The prohibition by the Convention of intervention in the
internal or external affairs of other states was strengthened in 1936
by the signing of the Additional Protocol Relative to Noninterven-
tion.131 The members of the 1936 conference in Buenos Aires desired
a more comprehensive expression of the principle of non-intervention
than that contained in the 1933 Convention. For this reason the del-
egates formulated article 1 which states: "The High Contracting
Parties declare impermissable the intervention of any one of them,
directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or ex-
ternal affairs of any other of the Parties." '132 By prohibiting both di-
rect and indirect intervention, the drafters of the treaty demon-
strated their concern with both foreign invasion and invasion by
subversive organizations supported by foreign countries. Under the
terms of this treaty and regardless of the justification, the support of
the contras by the United States constitutes indirect intervention in
the affairs of Nicaragua.
The primary method of resolving international conflicts was codi-
fied in another treaty enacted by the delegates in Buenos Aires in
1936. In the Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure the Ful-
fillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States,'13 3 the
signatories affirmed their obligation "to settle, by pacific means, con-
troversies of an international character that may arise between
them.' 34 The parties agreed to settle disputes through such peaceful
procedures as direct diplomatic negotiation, mediation, commissions
of inquiry, commissions of conciliation, tribunals of arbitration, and
courts of justice.ae
The United States has violated the terms of this treaty by resort-
ing to a policy of force rather than conciliation. An alternative dis-
12.
130. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, supra note 110.
131. Additional Protocol Relative to Nonintervention, Dec. 22, 1936, 51 Stat. 41,
T.S. No. 923 (also ratified by both the United States and Nicaragua).
132. Id. at art. I.
133. Coordination, Extension, and Fulfillment of Existing Treaties Between the
American States, Dec. 23, 1936, 51 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 926 [hereinafter cited as the
Convention to Fulfill Existing Treaties].
134. Id. at art. 1.
135. Id. at art. 4.
pute resolution procedure, the Contadora negotiations, 136 has been
endorsed by the United States and Nicaragua. Neither country,
however, is a member of the Contadora Group, 137 a body which
seeks to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict in Central
America.
The existence of a separate negotiation process does not relieve the
United States from its obligation, under the Convention to Fulfill
Existing Treaties, to settle all controversies through pacific means.
The United States instigated its policy of force against Nicaragua
two years prior to the commencement of the Contadora process and
has followed this policy to the present day. The United States' claim
that it is fulfilling its legal duty, through the Contadora, to resolve
the conflict by pacific means 138 rings hollow in light of the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors and the increased support given to contra
rebels.
The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 139 is a bi-
lateral treaty signed by the United States and Nicaragua on January
21, 1956.140 The stated purpose of the treaty was to improve eco-
nomic and cultural relations between the two countries. 141 Accord-
ingly, article 19 provides that "[b]etween the territories of the two
Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.' 42 In
providing for freedom of navigation, the treaty sought to insure that
136. Contadors is the name given to the continuing efforts of Colombia, Mexico,
Panama, and Venezuela to resolve the crisis in Central America. The foreign ministers of
these countries met for the first time in January 1983 on the Isla de Contadora. Their
purpose was to initiate dialogue and negotiation between the countries of Central
America in order to reduce the tensions in that region. The Contadora negotiations have
had limited success thus far. The four countries were able to draft a document of objec-
tives containing twenty-one basic points for achieving peace in Central America. This
document was agreed upon in principle by the United States and Nicaragua. See Con-
tadora: Peace Process in Central America, UN MONTHLY CHRON. vol. 3, 11 (1984). A
subsequent draft of a peace treaty, however, was accepted by Nicaragua but rejected by
the United States. L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 21, col. 1.
137. The Contadora group consists of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.
See Contadora: Peace Process in Central America, UN MONTHLY CHRON. vol. 3, 11
(1984).
138. In its counter-memorial to the ICJ, the United States claims that the Con-
tadora Process is the appropriate method for resolving the problems in Central America.
Counter-Memorial of the United States (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 229
(Counter-Memorial dated Aug. 17, 1984).
139. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 499,
T.I.A.S. 4024.
140. The Treaty was ratified by the United States on September 14, 1956 and by
Nicaragua on March 17, 1958. It entered into force on May 24, 1958.
141. The preface to the treaty provides: "The United States of America and the
Republic of Nicaragua, desirous of strengthening the bounds of peace and friendship
traditionally existing between them and encouraging closer economic and cultural rela-
tions between their people ... " See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation,
supra note 139.
142. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce & Navigation, supra note 139, at art.
19.
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shipping, the primary means of commercial and economic interaction
between the two countries, remained undisturbed. The mining of
Nicaraguan harbors obstructs navigation and shipping to and from
Nicaragua. This affects Nicaragua's trade and commerce not only
with other countries, but with the United States as well.
Customary International Law
Treaties and custom are closely related as sources of international
law. A rule of law may be contained in a treaty and also considered
a part of customary law. As embodied in a treaty, a rule of law is
binding only on the parties to that agreement. As a part of custom-
ary international law, however, the rule is also binding on other
states.1 43 The United States is bound, therefore, by rules of interna-
tional law which, although not agreed to in advance by the parties,
are in accord with the constant and uniform practices of states in the
international system.
Sovereignty
According to customary international law, the United States has
an obligation to respect the political and territorial sovereignty of
Nicaragua. In international law, sovereignty denotes independence;
the right not to be subject to external forces. 4 The principle of sov-
ereignty guarantees that a state has exclusive jurisdiction within its
own domain. This principle was incorporated in the United Nations
Charter and reaffirmed as a matter of customary law by subsequent
United Nations resolutions.1 45
There are two types of sovereignty protected by international law.
Territorial sovereignty involves the exercise of power by a state over
its physical or geographical territory. This includes the protection of
all land areas, territorial waters, and airspace from outside invasion
143. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 2 Y.
B. INT'L COMM. 368 (1950).
144. "Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Indepen-
dence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion
of any other State, the functions of a State." Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.) 1928
P.C.I.J., reprinted in HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 174
(1979).
145. See Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs
of States and Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, Dec. 21, 1965,
U.N.G.A. Res. 2131, [hereinafter cited as Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Interven-
tion]; Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force in International
Relations, G.A. Res. 2160 xxi (1965) [hereinafter cited as Prohibition of the Threat or
Use of Force].
or interference.1 46 Political sovereignty denotes the legal nature of
the authority of a state over its domain. 47 More specifically, it pro-
tects the right of a state to determine its own form of government.
Arguably, the actions of the United States in Nicaragua violate both
forms of sovereignty.
Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereign boundaries of a
state are longstanding principles of international law.148 The Island
of Palmas case, involving the United States and Holland, firmly es-
tablished the principle that a state has exclusive jurisdiction within
its own territory.1 49 In Corfu Channel, °5 0 the ICJ ruled that a mine-
sweeping operation conducted by the British navy violated the sover-
eignty of Albania. The operation was conducted within Albanian ter-
ritorial waters and against the expressed will of its government.' 5'
The Court held that, "[b]etween independent States, respect for ter-
ritorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international
relations." 152
The United States has infringed upon Nicaraguan territory in
three respects. First, the support of contra forces involved in attacks
within Nicaragua constitutes an infringement and invasion of Nica-
raguan territory. This action is specifically condemned by a 1965
146. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0 SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 256
(1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN & PUGH].
147. M. SORENSEN, supra note 80, at 313.
148. The principle of territorial sovereignty was outlined by Chief Justice John
Marshall in the Schooner Exchange case:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tion on it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminuation
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sov-
ereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its
own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can
flow from no other legitimate source.
The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden, II U.S. 136 (1812).
149. Island of Palmas, reprinted in HARRIS, supra note 144, at 174.
150. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, reprinted in L.C. GREEN, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE CASES 228 (1978).
151. This ruling was one in a series of rulings involving a rather complex conflict
between Great Britain and Albania. On May 15, 1946, Albanian coastal batteries fired
upon British warships passing through the Corfu Channel, in Albanian territorial waters.
On October 22, 1946, two British warships passing through that Channel struck mines,
which caused damage to the vessels and loss of life among the crews. On November 12-
13, 1946, British ships, without Albanian consent, swept for mines in that part of the
Corfu Channel which lay in Albanian waters. The ICJ considered the issues of Albania's
responsibility for the explosions and the resulting damage, and also the legality of British
actions in sweeping the Channel. The Court, by eleven votes to five, held Albania respon-
sible for the explosions and the ensuing damage. It also unanimously ruled that the
United Kingdom had violated Albanian sovereignty in sweeping her territorial waters.
Perspective, International Court of Justice, UN MONTHLY CHRON. Vol. 20, No. 11,
Dec. 1983 at 47.
152. Corfu Channel, reprinted in GREEN, supra note 150, at 236.
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United Nations resolution on the illegality of intervention in the do-
mestic affairs of a foreign country. This resolution, the Declaration
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,
prohibits the direct or indirect use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity of any state.153
Second, mining Nicaraguan harbors is a violation of Nicaraguan
territorial waters. 154 If in Corfu Channel the ICJ found that sweep-
ing the territorial waters of another country for mines violated the
principle of sovereignty, then logically it would follow that placing
mines in the waters of another country is an even greater violation
this principle.
Third, the unauthorized intrusion by United States military air-
planes into Nicaraguan airspace violates Nicaragua's territorial air-
space.155 Legally, airspace forms an integral part of the territory of a
state. Such airspace falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sub-
jacent state.156 According to one jurist, even a temporary incursion,
without permission, into the airspace of another state constitutes a
153. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 145.
154. The harbors and ports of a state have long been considered a part of her
territory. "As in Roman law, ports, harbours and roadsteads, dependencies of maritime
territory, form part of the domain of the state in nearly all modern countries and are
subject to a right of sovereignty." R. HIGGINS & C.J. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA, 2d ed. 113, reprinted in 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
259 (1965). In addition, articles 1 and 2 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention provide
that a coastal state has the same sovereignty over its territorial sea and over the airspace,
seabed, and subsoil thereof, as it has with respect to its land territory. Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639.
155. In the Security Council, United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, openly acknowledged that the United States engages in regular over-
flights of Nicaragua to obtain intelligence information for the contras attacking Nicara-
gua. U.N. SCOR S/PV 2335, Mar. 22, 1982.
156. This principle, first developed after World War I, was affirmed by the Chi-
cago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1951, 15 U.N.T.S. 296, reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, 503-04 (1981). The Chicago Convention
provides:
Article I. The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.
Article 2. For the purpose of this Convention the territory of a State shall be
deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the
sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.
Article 3(b). Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be
deemed to be state aircraft.
Article 3(c). No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory
of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or
otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.
Id.
violation of its territorial integrity.15 7
Regarding political sovereignty, the U.N. Resolution of the Prohi-
bition of the Threat or Use of Force affirms the right of every nation,
whether large or small, to freely choose without external interfer-
ence, its political, social, and economic systems. 158 This right of self-
determination was incorporated in the United Nations Charter by
the Declaration on Friendly Relations in 1970.15" The OAS recog-
nized the diversity of ideologies in the international system and ac-
cordingly adopted measures protecting it. A declaration, passed in
1973, guarantees a state the right of self-determination regardless of
its political and ideological persuasions.6 0 Hence, there are no legal
prohibitions against a regime adopting a Marxist orientation as Nic-
aragua has done. The goal of the contras, the overthrow of the pre-
sent Nicaraguan government, conflicts with the principles of self-de-
termination. Thus, support of the contras by the United States
constitutes a violation of Nicaragua's sovereignty.
Proof that the United States is attempting to interfere in the do-
157. R. HIGGINS. THE LEGAL LIMITS TO THE USE OF FORCE 183 (1962).
158. Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force, supra note 145.
159. The provisions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations concerning self-deter-
mination provide:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social
and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives
peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right
to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against
and resistance to such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to
self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.
See supra note 73.
160. This resolution, Principles Governing Relations Among the American States,
was adopted by the General Assembly of the OAS on April 15, 1973. It reads in part:
i. That in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the Organization,
and especially with those of mutual respect for sovereignty, the self-determina-
tion of peoples, and the juridicial equality of states, every state has the right to
adopt, with complete independence, its own system of government and economic
and social organizations.
2. That, under the Charter, plurality of ideologies is a presupposition of regional
solidarity, which is based on the concept of cooperation freely accepted by sover-
eign states, to achieve common objectives of maintenance of peace and under-
standing among them for the sake of their vigorous and dynamic development in
the economic and social fields and in those of education, science, and culture.
3. That plurality of ideologies in relations among the member states implies the
duty of each state to respect the principles of nonintervention and self-determi-
nation of peoples and the right to demand compliance with those principles by
the other states.
Principles Governing Relations Among the American States, reprinted in F.V. GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 106, at 79.
[VOL. 22: 895. 1985] A Machiavellian Dilemma
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
mestic affairs of Nicaragua was provided in a statement by President
Reagan in March of 1984. In an interview with reporters, the Presi-
dent indicated that the goal of the United States in supporting the
contras was to force a change in the internal policies of Nicaragua.
The President stated: "We have made it plain to Nicaragua - made
it very plain - that this will stop when they keep their promise and
restore a democratic rule." ' From a human rights perspective, the
desire to institute democracy in Nicaragua is understandable. From
an international law perspective, however, such a desire violates Nic-
aragua's sovereignty.
Freedom of the Seas
By mining the harbors of Nicaragua, the United States is doing
more than harassing the government of Nicaragua and damaging its
fishing trawlers. The actions of the United States infringe upon the
right of all nations to enjoy the freedom of the seas. The concept
that the seas are free and open to all countries and thus can not be
made subject to the control of any individual country is one of the
oldest enduring principles of international law. Developed in the sev-
enteenth century by the Dutch jurist Hogo Grotius, it is based upon
the belief that the oceans are not divisible, but are subject to the
common ownership of mankind. 162 Freedom of the seas was largely a
matter of customary international law until codified and developed
by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.1 63
Insofar as the Conventions codify customary law, they reflect princi-
ples that are binding on all states including those which have not
161. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 8. In a press conference on February
21, 1985, President Reagan acknowledged that the United States supported the removal
of the Nicaraguan government: "You can say we're trying to oust Sandinistas .. .
L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
162. H. GROTIus, DE JURi BELLI AC PAcis, reprinted in M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 501 (1965).
163. The 1958 Law of the Sea Conference adopted four conventions: Convention
of Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17
U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969 [hereinafter cited as the Fishing on the High Seas Con-
vention]; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578 [hereinafter cited as the Continental Shelf Convention]; Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639
[hereinafter cited as the Territorial Sea Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 [hereinafter cited as the High Seas Con-
vention]. A more comprehensive and inclusive Law of the Sea Treaty was signed in 1982
in Kingston, Jamaica. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the 1982 Convention].
ratified them."6 4
Freedom of the seas traditionally has meant the freedom of their
usage for purposes such as navigation, fishing, trade, travel, and
war. 165 Moreover, the concept stands for the proposition that in
peacetime vessels on the open seas may not be disturbed. 66 The
right to unobstructed navigation of the open seas extends to passages
through territorial waters. The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provide that "ships of all States
.. . enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea." 16 7 Passage includes navigation through the territorial sea for
the purpose of "proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at
such roadstead or port facility."' 8
The customary right of innocent passage through territorial waters
includes the freedom of access to ports.16 9 This customary rule of
international law derives from the 1923 Statute on the International
Regime of Maritime Ports, which established the principle of open
access to ports by foreign merchant vessels. 170 The principle permits
greater latitude in the flow of international trade and commerce, and
protects against unwarranted discrimination in the treatment ac-
164. The 1982 Convention, supra note 163, was signed in December 1982 by more
than 120 countries. The United States did not sign because it found unacceptable certain
provisions regarding deep seabed mining. The United States did announce, however, that
it would recognize essentially all the other provisions as customary international law and
thus binding on all states. L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA, XiX-XX
(1984). Cf. Gamble & Frankowski, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the
Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491 (1984).
The authors warn that because of the comprehensive and heterogeneous nature of the
Convention, its provisions differ in the degree to which they codify existing customary
international law.
165. Today these freedoms include, but are not limited to: (1) freedom of naviga-
tion; (2) freedom of overflight; (3) freedom of fishing; and (4) freedom to lay submarine
cables and pipelines. High Seas Convention, supra note 163, at art. 2.
166. Article 88 of the 1982 Convention provides: "The high seas shall be reserved
for peaceful purposes." 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1287 (1982). Article 301 of the same Conven-
tion states:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention,
States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.
Id. at 1326.
167. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 163, at art. 14; 1982 Convention,
supra note 163, at art. 17.
168. 1982 Convention, supra note 163, at art. 18.
169. L. SOHN & K. GUSTAFSON, supra note 164, at 79-80.
170. The 1923 Statute was relied upon by an international tribunal in arbitration
between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Arabian American Oil Company as
follows: "According to a great principle of public international law, the ports of every
State must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital
interests of the State so require." Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company,
Award of August 23, 1938, 27 INT'L L. REP. 117, 212 (1963).
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corded to ships of different states.17 1
According to the principle of innocent passage, the planting of
mines by the United States in Nicaraguan harbors violates the cus-
tomary right of freedom of the seas. The United States has a legal
obligation not to interfere with international navigation and com-
merce. The obstruction of Nicaraguan harbors, the damage to Nica-
raguan and foreign commercial vessels, and the resulting decline in
the passage of vessels to and from Nicaragua, all constitute viola-
tions by the United States of its international responsibilities.
The mining of Nicaraguan harbors may also be considered a
blockade, a measure traditionally lawful only during wartime. Inter-
ference with commercial maritime traffic, in the absence of a state of
war between countries, is illegal under international law stan-
dards. 17 2 The use of mines to interfere with commercial maritime
traffic is illegal at all times under these standards. Parties to the
Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 agreed to forbid the laying
of "automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy,
with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. ' 73 The
United States cannot justify the minings by claiming its activities
were aimed only at preventing military shipments to and from Nica-
ragua.17 4 The use of automatic contact mines is lawful only where
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate objects of sea
warfare is possible.1 7 5 The mines used in this operation were not of
the type which could differentiate between a Soviet freighter carry-
ing weapons and a Japanese freighter carrying manufactured
goods.17 6
171. "[I]n time of peace, commercial ports must be left open to international traf-
fic. The liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and
unload their cargoes, embark and disembark their passengers." R. HIGGINs & C.J.
COLOMBOS, supra note 154, at 259.
172. The 1921 Wanderer case explicates the law of the sea on the right to impede
or interfere with foreign ships in peacetime. The Anglo-United States Arbitral Tribunal
held that "the fundamental principle of the international maritime law is that no nation
can exercise a right of visitation and search over foreign vessels pursuing a lawful voca-
tion on the high seas, except in time of war or by special agreement." G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 595 (1968).
173. Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Mines, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541.
174. According to one report, contra forces announced as early as January 8, 1984
that they were mining Nicaraguan ports to prevent the arrival of weapons from Cuba
and the Soviet Union. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 19.
175. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 172, at 417.
176. This is evidenced by the fact that the CIA mines damaged vessels from both
of these countries. For a detailed account of the type of mines used in the operation, see
Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 20.
By hindering or obstructing free access to Nicaraguan harbors,
the United States is engaging in an activity tantamount to a pacific
blockade.177 Such a blockade is now considered a violation of inter-
national law.1 8
The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is the most recent international
incident involving a blockade. 11 Although the United States called
its actions a "quarantine" rather than a blockade, 180 its purposes in
intercepting and interfering with shipping to and from Cuba resem-
ble those behind the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. The legality of
the quarantine under international law has been the subject of much
debate by legal scholars.'
Proponents of the United States' actions justify the quarantine on
the grounds that it was imposed pursuant to the collective judgment
and recommendation of the OAS under the terms of the Rio
177. A pacific blockade is a blockade during a time of peace.
178. "In view of the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, pacific blockade is now an obsolete institution of international law." M. SOREN-
SEN, supra note 80, at 755. Even when the procedure of pacific blockade was generally
acceptable in international law, the United States recognized that it did not permit inter-
ference with vessels of a third state, but only with vessels of the blockading and the
blockaded states. An 1858 Senate resolution asserted:
American vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, bearing the American flag,
remain under the jurisdication of the country to which they belong, and there-
fore any visitation, molestation, or detention of such vessels by force, or by the
exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign power, is in derogation of the sover-
eignty of the United States.
2 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 946 (1906). A pacific blockade, therefore, is
unlawful if it interferes with vessels of a third country. This principle can certainly be
applied to the United States' mining of Nicaraguan ports which damaged vessels from
Japan, Holland and other countries.
179. In 1962 the Soviet government began the construction of several missile sites
in Cuba. The United States requested the Soviet Union to stop these activities in Cuba
and to dismantle the existing sites. Simultaneously, the United States ordered its forces
to intercept the delivery to Cuba of certain categories of military equipment. To make
the action effective, the United States declared its intention to stop and search vessels
proceeding to Cuba. The Soviet Union and certain other states protested the United
States' measures, but the OAS adopted a resolution calling on all members to take col-
lective action to help enforce them. The dispute was finally resolved in negotiations be-
tween the United States and the USSR whereby the United States agreed to end the
quarantine in return for the Soviet removal of the missile equipment. See generally 5 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 443 (1965).
180. Sorensen maintains that the Cuban quarantine was not a pacific blockade
because it applied to vessels or crafts of third states. Its purpose was to prevent Soviet
shipping to Cuba rather than to completely cut off Cuba from the rest of the world. M.
SORENSEN, supra note 80, at 757.
181. For a discussion of the legality of the quarantine by those who thought it
lawful, see generally Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L., 515
(1963); Christol and Davis, Maritime Quarantine: The Navel Interdiction of Offensive
Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba, 1962, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1963); Mc-
Dougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
For a discussion by those who thought the quarantine unlawful, see generally Wright,
The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963); Akehurst, Enforcement Action
by Regional Agencies, with Special Reference to the Organization of American States,
42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 197-203 (1967).
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Treaty." 2 The proponents argue that the quarantine did not contra-
vene article 2(4) of the UN Charter because it was a measure
adopted by a regional organization to promote peace and security in
conformity with the provisions of chapter VIII of the Charter.183
Critics of the quarantine claim that it represented an effort to en-
force a settlement of the dispute without any prior attempt at resolu-
tion by negotiation. 8 4 Additionally, critics argue that the quarantine
forcibly interfered with the rights of states to freely navigate the
high seas in a time of peace. 8 5
Whether the quarantine by the United States violated interna-
tional law remains the source of much dispute. What is clear, how-
ever, is that the United States' justification of the Cuban quarantine
cannot be used to justify the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. The
actions of the United States in the Cuban crisis were carried out in
accordance with the collective consent of the OAS under the provi-
sions of the Rio Treaty.' 8 The actions of the United States in Nica-
ragua, however, are unilateral measures taken without the consent of
the OAS, and in contravention of the expressly stated position of the
UN.18 7
182. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
183. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows regional organizations to take mea-
sures to maintain international peace and security providing such measures are consistent
with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Thus, regional organizations can resort
to the use of individual or collective self-defense as provided in article 51 of the UN
Charter. United States Legal Advisor Leonard Meeker advanced these arguments to jus-
tify the actions of the United States. See Meeker, supra note 181.
184. M. SORENSEN, supra note 80, at 757.
185. Id.
186. The Council of the OAS met on October 23, 1962 to discuss the United
States' request. It adopted a resolution recommending:
[t]he member states, in accordance with Article 6 and 8 of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively,
including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that
the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers
military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and secur-
ity of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability
from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent.
47 DEP'T ST. BULL. 723 (1962).
187. Resolution 530, adopted in May, 1983, by the UN Security Council, reaf-
firmed "the right of Nicaragua and of all the other countries of the area to live in peace
and security, free from outside interference," 20 UN MONTHLY CHRON. 35 (No. 7, July
1983) (emphasis added).
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DEFENSE
Introduction
Having applied the relevant legal principles - treaties and cus-
tom - to the facts of this conflict, it is evident that the actions of
the United States in Nicaragua violate international law. There re-
mains, however, the issue of whether these actions, despite their ille-
gal nature, are justified under the generally recognized rights of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense in international law.
Self-defense stands as an exception to the general prohibition
against the use of force in international law. The purpose of the right
of self-defense is to "justify action, otherwise illegal, which is neces-
sary to protect certain essential rights of the state against violation
by other states." 188 Grotius stated that the origin of the right of self-
defense was in "the fact that nature commits to each his own protec-
tion, not in the injustice or crime of the aggressor." 189
The modern formulation of the right of self-defense derives in
large part from the Caroline Case.1 90 In 1837, United States Secre-
tary of State Daniel Webster sent a protest note to the British gov-
ernment, disputing Britain's claim that its destruction of an Ameri-
can vessel, the Caroline, was justified by the right of self-defense. In
the note, Webster outlined the general scope of the right of self-
defense. He stated that the British government must "show a neces-
sity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation."19 Moreover, according to
Webster, the British had to prove they "did nothing unreasonable
and excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense,
must be limited to that necessity, and kept clearly within it."' 2
The Caroline Case recognized two important principles which con-
stitute the basis of most modern formulations of the right of self-
defense. The first principle is that the exercise of self-defense may be
justified only in cases where there is a threatened or actual armed
attack. Professor Brownlie has noted that in state practice, both
before and after World War II, "resort to force by virtue of the right
of self-defense is almost without exception associated with the idea
188. D. BowErr. SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1958).
189. H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 172 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
190. The case arose out of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. An armed force, with-
out the support of the United States government, enlisted the assistance of a number of
American citizens in raiding Canadian territory. The force was supplied by an American
ship, the Caroline. On the night of December 29, British forces crossed the Niagara
River, seized the Caroline which was then in an American port, set fire to it and sent it
over Niagara Falls. Two American citizens were killed. The legality of the British acts
was questioned in correspondence between the United States and British Governments.
D. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 676 (1979).
191. Id. at 677.
192. Id.
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of reaction against the use of force."1 93 Many scholars support this
narrow interpretation of the self-defense privilege. 94
The second principle limits the international legal right of self-
defense by the requirement that the force employed must be propor-
tionate to the intensity of the challenge and the immediacy of the
danger.9 5 Such a requirement injects a degree of protection from,
and regulation of, excessive use of force in the international system.
Closely related to the concept of individual self-defense is the con-
cept of collective self-defense. Under international law, collective
measures may be initiated by a group of countries in protection of
the legal rights of individual states. The requirements of the right of
collective self-defense are: (1) that each participating state have an
individual right of self-defense, and (2) that an agreement exists be-
tween the participating states to exercise their rights collectively. 196
The purpose of a system of collective self-defense is to deter aggres-
sive behavior by insuring that, if an armed conflict occurs, other
states will align themselves with the victim against the law-breaker
or aggressor.Y97
Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter
The principle exception to the general prohibition on the use of
force in article 2(4) of the UN Charter is contained in article 51 of
the Charter. 9 8 This article permits a country to act in either individ-
193. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 182, 183
(1962).
194. "It is important to emphasize the narrow nature of self-defense, as forceful
self-help in reply to a forceful denial of rights." Higgens, The Legal Limits to the Use of
Force by Sovereign States United Nations Practice, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 298
(1962). This view is shared by Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense
Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784 (1948) who states
that "self defense . . . is self-help against a specific violation of the law, against the
illegal use of force, not against other violations of the law." See also M. SORENSEN, supra
note 80, at 766-67, who maintains that the contemporary view of the UN and a majority
of its members is that a state may act in individual self-defense only if an armed attack
occurs against it. But see D. BowErT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1958)
who believes that certain international acts justify action in self-defense even if those acts
do not involve force.
195. "The criterion by which the legality of the measures used in self-defense will
be judged is that of proportionality." D. BowETT, supra note 188, at 261.
196. Bowett, Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 32
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 130, 139-40 (1955-56).
197. Hans Morgenthau writes: "It is the purpose of collective security to make war
possible by marshalling in defense of the status quo such overwhelming strength that no
nation will dare to resort to force in order to change the status quo." H. MORGENTHAU,
POLITIcS AMONG NATIONS 334 (1948).
198. Article 51 reads:
ual or collective self-defense if n armed attack occurs against a
member of the UN. There has been much discussion concerning the
interpretation of this article.199 One position asserts a narrow inter-
pretation. Hence, the words "if an armed attack occurs" are con-
strued to mean that an armed attack must have already occurred
before the use of force in self-defense is justified.2 °0 Consequently,
there is no right of anticipatory self-defense in the case of a
threatened attack.20 1
The contrary view is that article 51 was not intended to limit the
circumstances under which self-defense may be exercised. Under this
approach, a state may resort to self-defense when a violation of ei-
ther the prohibition against force, or the rights of territorial integ-
rity, political independence, or economic freedom occurs.2 °2 Thus, as
soon as an essential right has been compromised, or even prior to
that time, the affected state may act in anticipatory self-defense
against the aggressor. Recent trends in UN practices suggest adop-
tion of a restrictive view of self-defense; a trend thus indicative of
modern international law.203
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exer-
cise of the right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
199. See supra note 194.
200. Sorensen writes that under the Charter". .. there is no room for self-defense
even if the most fundamental and vital rights of the state have been endangered or vio-
lated in a manner which does not constitute an armed attack." M. SORENSEN, supra note
80, at 767.
201. "It is submitted, however, that anticipatory self-defense is incompatible with
the Charter. Article 51 is an exception to article 2(4), and it is a general rule of interpre-
tation that exceptions to a principle should be interpreted restrictively, so as not to un-
dermine the principles." M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 243 (1967).
202. D. BowETT, supra note 194, at 24 (1958).
203. Sorensen cites several instances where the UN gave its backing to the restric-
tive interpretation and refused to regard the offensive use of armed force as self-defense.
These include the hostilities between Pakistan and India in 1948, the Suez Canal conflict
in 1956, and the Tunisian question in 1958. M. SORENSEN, supra note 80, at 767. Many
commentators argue, however, that in the nuclear age allowing the aggressor to strike the
first blow would completely destroy the state complying with international law. Professor
Friedman claims that with the advent of nuclear rockets and missiles "the right of self-
defense must probably now be extended to the defense against clearly imminent aggres-
sion, despite the apparently contrary language of article 51 of the Charter." Friedman,
The Changing Structure of International Law, reprinted in HENKIN & PUGH, supra note
146, at 932. It would appear, however, that anticipatory use of self-defense will be justi-
fied only in extreme cases. The Caroline definition of self-defense which requires an "in-
stant and overwhelming" necessity "leaving no choice of means and no moment for delib-
eration" is still valid. According to Professor Rohlik, the permissible standards for
justifying anticipatory use of force in self-defense are very stringent:
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Self-Defense Under the O.A.S. Charter and the Rio Treaty
Article 51204 of the UN Charter authorizes regional organizations
to deal with matters related to the maintenance of peace and secur-
ity in their regions. The OAS has the authority, by virtue of articles
18 and 20 of its Charter, to prohibit the use of force or other types
of intervention in the Western Hemisphere. 05 The only exception to
these broad prohibitions is provided by article 22, which states that
"[m]easures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in
accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the
principles set forth in [a]rticles 18 and 20.' '2°0 One such measure is
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the
Rio Treaty),20 7 which provides for a system of collective self-defense
among the American states.208 Article 3 of the Rio Treaty estab-
lishes the principle that an armed attack by any state against an
American state shall be considered an attack against all American
states. The parties to the Rio Treaty contracted to "assist in meeting
the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collec-
The danger of obliteration of the threatened state must be real, the threatening
state must be in a position to obliterate the threatened state, the threatening
state must have the means to obliterate the threatened state, and there must be
sufficient evidence to support the belief of the intended victim that the threaten-
ing state made the decision to attack.
Rohlik, Remarks to Self-Defense and Intervention: A Reaction to Pending Law and
Civil War in the Modern World, 6 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 395, 419 (1977).
204. Article 52 provides:
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments of agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or con-
stituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference to the Security
Council.
205. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
206. OAS CHARTER, art. 22.
207. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947,
62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838.
208. The preamble of the Rio Treaty states its purpose as assuring peace "through
adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks
against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any
of them." Id.
tive self-defense recognized by article 51 of the UN Charter."' 09 Ar-
ticle 3 also endorses the right of an individual state to use force, at
the request and in defense of a state or states directly attacked, until
such time as the Organ of Consultation is able to meet and discuss
what collective measures should be taken by the OAS. 210
The Rio Treaty also allows the use of force in self-defense under
article 6 if:
.the inviolability or the integrity of territory or the sovereignty or politi-
cal independence of any American State should be affected by an aggres-
sion which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-conti-
nental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the
peace of America.2 1
Article 6 would thus appear to justify the use of force in defense of
another country whose sovereignty is violated by "aggression which
is not an armed attack." Such a self-defense privilege is qualified,
however, by the remainder of article 6 which allows force to be em-
ployed only with the approval of the Organ of Consultation.212
Thus, the Rio Treaty permits the use of self-defensive force in two
situations. Under article 3, individual or collective self-defense may
be taken pursuant to article 51 of the UN Charter; under article 6,
the self-defense privilege may be asserted only by a decision of the
Organ of Consultation.
The Legal Position of the United States
In a radio address to the nation, President Reagan outlined the
position of the United States in Central America:
We support the elected Government of El Salvador against Communist-
backed guerrillas who would takeover the country by force. And we oppose
the unelected Government of Nicaragua, which supports those guerrillas
with weapons and ammunition .... Our neighbors in the Americas are
important to us, and they need our help .... [W]e're helping our neigh-
bors create a defensive shield to protect themselves from Communist
intervention.2
3
Essentially, the United States' legal position is that its actions in Nicaragua
209, Id. at art. 3(1).
210. Id. at art. 3(2). The Organ of Consultation is a body of the OAS consisting of
the foreign ministers of each member country. The Organ convenes to consider urgent
problems of common interest to the American states or in cases of armed attack or other
threats to international peace and security. The purpose of the Organ is to maintain
peace, settle disputes and resist armed attacks in the Americas. See ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, A HANDBOOK 12 (1977).
211. Rio Treaty, art. 6, see supra note 207.
212. [T]he Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on
the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of
the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the com-
mon defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the
Continent.
Id. at art. 6.
213. Radio Address to the Nation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1127-28 (Aug.
13, 1983).
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are justified under the principle of collective self-defense.21 4 According to
the United States, article 51 of the UN Charter "precludes impairment of
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense."21 5 The United
States claims that its actions against Nicaragua are in response to a request
for help from the government of El Salvador, which is engaged in a civil
war with Nicaraguan-supported rebels. According to the United States,
Nicaragua's act of aggression, directed against El Salvador, activates the
collective defense measures incorporated in the UN Charter and the Rio
Treaty. The United States, therefore, is obligated to come to the defense of
a fellow member of this collective security system.
Flaws in the Legal Position of the United States
The position of the United States, that its use of force against
Nicaragua is legal under the principle of collective self-defense, is
indefensible under international law. There are three defects in the
argument. First, the actions of the United States in Nicaragua are
unilateral, not collective. Funding and supplying contra forces with-
out the support, participation, or approval of the UN or the OAS
can hardly be considered a collective action. Second, the United
States is obligated to settle all disputes by peaceful means. 216 The
use of force, prior to exhausting all non-coercive means of settle-
ment, violates the treaty commitments of the United States.217
Third, the United States' use of force against Nicaragua does not
adhere to the strict requirements of necessity and proportionality
which form an integral part of the right of self-defense.21
As to the first of these three flaws, acts of collective self-defense
must be authorized by the participating members of the collective
system. Article 51 of the UN Charter allows the use of individual or
collective self-defense "until the Security Council has taken mea-
sures necessary to maintain international peace and security."219 The
exercise of collective self-defense, however, is regulated by the re-
quirement that its application must be immediately reported to the
Security Council. 220 The covert nature of the United States' support
214. Allan Gerson, Special Assistant to the UN Ambassador, writes:
In Central America, the United States is responding to the request of the Gov-
ernment of El Salvador to stop Nicaragua's flow of arms, training and command
support to Salvadoran insurgents. Under international law, such activity is tan-
tamount to an armed attack in violation of the United Nations Charter and
permits individual and collective self-defense measures.
Gerson, U.S. Acts Lawfully, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1984, at 24, col. 1.
215. Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 138, at 219.
216. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
219. U.N. CHARTER art. 151, supra note 198.
220. Id.
to contra forces has prevented the United States from officially ac-
knowledging its activities, let alone reporting them to the Security
Council. Additionally, El Salvador has not requested, nor informed
the Security Council of a need for collective self-defense mea-
sures.221 The United States, therefore, cannot justify the use of force
under article 51 without the authorization of the Security Council. 22
Similarly, article 3 of the Rio Treaty requires that, when collective
measures are undertaken at the request of a state "directly at-
tacked," the Organ of Consultation of the OAS "shall meet without
delay" to agree upon the measures to be taken. 23 Article 6 specifi-
cally prohibits the use of force in collective self-defense against indi-
rect aggression without the approval of the Organ of Consultation.224
In the present situation, Nicaragua has neither invaded nor directly
attacked El Salvador. However, the supplying of arms to Salvadoran
rebels constitutes indirect aggression within the scope of article 6.
According to the Rio Treaty, therefore, measures taken by the
United States in collective self-defense of El Salvador must be au-
thorized by the OAS. 22 5 By using covert force against Nicaragua,
the United States has disregarded the lawful collective enforcement
procedures of the OAS system.
In contrast, during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States en-
joyed the full support of the OAS. The importance of OAS authori-
zation to the legality of the actions of the United States during that
conflict was recognized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. He
stated that "[ift was the vote of the Organization of American
States that gave a legal basis for the quarantine.... It...changed
221. All discussions by the Security Council of the situation in Central America
have been at the request and initiation of Nicaragua. See UN CHRON., VOL. 20, Nos. 5, 7,
and 10 (1983).
222. Professor Bowett writes:
The individual members cannot on the one hand delegate primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council
(Art. 24), and on the other claim this right of unilateral action to support any
state which they consider to be acting in self-defense. This sort of freedom of
alliance cannot stand together with a system of collective security as centralized
as the United Nations Charter. The Charter clearly intends that the prohibition
of Art. 2(4) will admit only the minimum exception of self-defense, strictly con-
strued, and subject to the overriding authority of the Security Council.
Bowett, Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 130, 139 (1955-56).
223. Rio Treaty, supra note 210, art. 3(2).
224. Rio Treaty, supra note 211, art. 6.
225. The members of the Organization of American States have condemned
resort to the threat or use of force and have obligated themselves to settle all
disputes peacefully. Thus, under that organization, armed sanctions pursued as
reprisals to vindicate the law are absolutely prohibited unless taken collectively
under the authority of the O.A.S.
Thomas, Non-Intervention and Public Order in the Americas, PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L.
72, 74 (1959).
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our position from that of an outlaw acting in violation of interna-
tional law into a country acting in accordance with twenty allies le-
gally protecting their positions."22 6
The second flaw in the position of the United States is its use of
force in attempting to resolve the conflict with Nicaragua, prior to
exhausting all peaceful means of settlement. Article 2 (3) of the UN
Charter calls on all members to "settle their international disputes
by peaceful means and in such manner that international peace and
security, and justice are not endangered." 227 The Charter further
provides that parties to a conflict must first seek a solution to their
dispute through the settlement procedures contained in article 33.228
Similar provisions regarding the pacific settlement of disputes are
contained in the OAS Charter.229 These obligations are also recog-
nized by a number of treaties to which the United States is a
signatory.230
The United States has violated its obligations under international
law by failing to pursue strictly peaceful means of resolving its dif-
ferences with Nicaragua. In 1981, President Reagan demanded that
the flow of arms from Nicaragua to Salvadoran rebels be halted.23 1
Attempts to resolve the situation proved unsatisfactory to both coun-
tries.23 2 Rather than continuing to seek a diplomatic resolution, the
United States began delivering covert military assistance to the con-
tra forces.233
The policies of the United States in Nicaragua have been directed
226. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 121 (1969).
227. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(2).
228. Article 33(1) provides: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
229. Article 22 provides: "All international disputes that may arise between Amer-
ican States shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before
being referred to the Security Council of the United Nations." Article 24 further pro-
vides: "The following are peaceful procedures: direct negotiation, good offices, mediation,
investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and those which the par-
ties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any time."
230. See Convention to Fulfill Existing Treaties, supra note 133, art. 4; Anti-War
Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, supra note 127, art. 6.
231. See U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua, CONG. DIG., Nov. 1984, at 261.
232. Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, went
to Nicaragua in August 1981 to meet with officials of the Sandinista government. This
meeting, however, failed to achieve a solution to the Nicaraguan problem. See L.A.
Times, Mar. 3, 1985 at 10, col. 5.
233. Id. See also Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 18.
more toward military pressure than diplomatic settlement under the
Reagan administration. Between 1981 and 1984 the United States
spent more than $80 million on military aid to the contra forces.2 "
During that same period, no high level contact or negotiation be-
tween the two countries took place.23 5 It would appear, therefore,
that the United States has decided to pursue a policy of force rather
than negotiation in Nicaragua. Such a policy violates the duty of the
United States to resolve international disputes through peaceful
means.
The third defect in the argument of the United States is that its
use of force against Nicaragua is far greater than that allowed under
the international principles of collective self-defense. The require-
ments set forth in the Caroline case indicate that the amount of
force employed must be proportional to the intensity of the challenge
and the immediacy of the danger.2 36 The organization and support of
contra forces attacking Nicaragua fails to meet these proportionality
requirements. The contras are engaged in actual combat with Nica-
ragua, which has resulted in serious violations of Nicaragua's sover-
eignty. Their level of aggression far exceeds that employed by Nica-
ragua in its aid of the Salvadoran rebels. The use of force by the
United States in collective self-defense would be legally justified only
if Nicaraguan assistance to Salvadoran rebels was serious enough to
constitute an "armed attack. ' '23 7
Lawful Approach to Resolving the Nicaraguan Problem
The original goal of the United States, to prevent the flow of arms
from Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador, is a legitimate objective
under international law. The unilateral use of covert force, however,
is not a legitimate method of achieving that goal. Although interna-
tional law does not require the United States to stand idly by while
Nicaragua supplies Salvadoran rebels, it does require certain public
procedural steps.
The lawful approach to resolving the conflict between these two
countries requires the invocation of specific regional peacekeeping
procedures.23 8 Article 52 of the UN Charter 239 and article 23 of the
OAS Charter24 0 provide that efforts to resolve international disputes
234. Explosion over Nicaragua, supra note 2, at 16.
235. L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
236. See supra notes 190-91.
237. See supra note 194 and accompanying text which details the relatively lim-
ited scope of the self-defense privilege in international law.
238. "The question of Central America should be resolved within the context of
the region and by peaceful means through negotiations." Statement of Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cuellar, Dec. 21, 1983 reprinted in 21 UN CHRON., vol. 3, 9 (1984).
239. U.N. CHARTER art. 52, see supra note 204.
240. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 23, see supra note 106.
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between American states must originate in the region in which the
dispute arose. Thus, if Nicaragua's action in supporting Salvadoran
rebels violates article 18 of the OAS Charter,241 the appropriate re-
sponse by the United States would be to call for a convocation of the
Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty. This body could assess
the accuracy of the United States' charges and encourage Nicaragua
to comply with article 18.242 If Nicaragua fails to abide by the Or-
gan of Consultation, the Organ may impose economic sanctions
under the authority of article 6243 until the violations cease.
244
Should efforts to resolve this conflict within the regional frame-
work fail, the United States is obligated to pursue a peaceful resolu-
tion of the matter through article 33 of the UN Charter which speci-
fies that countries involved in a dispute shall first seek a solution by
peaceful means.245 If the parties cannot settle their differences
through the measures indicated in article 33,246 they must refer their
dispute to the Security Council.2 47 These provisions clearly require
that in the absence of a negotiated or diplomatic settlement, the
United States must bring its grievances against Nicaragua to the
Security Council.248 Articles 34 and 36 delegate to the Security
Council the authority to investigate any dispute or situation giving
rise to "international friction" and to recommend appropriate meth-
ods of adjustment.2 49 These methods involve non-forceful measures,
such as economic and diplomatic pressure by member states against
241. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 18, see supra note 106.
242. Id.
243. Rio Treaty, art. 6, see supra note 207.
244. Such a procedure was followed by the Venezuelan government in July 1960,
when it requested a convocation of the Organ of Consultation to assess the acts of inter-
vention and aggression by the Dominican Republic against Venezuela. The Organ of
Consultation convened to investigate Venezuela's charge and subsequently concluded
that the events came within article 6 of the Rio Treaty. The Consultation voted on behalf
of all member states to break off diplomatic and economic relations with the Dominican
Republic. Relations with the Dominican Republic were resumed two years later after a
special committee of the OAS concluded that the Dominican Republic was no longer a
danger to the peace and security of the Americas. 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 793-96 (1971).
245. U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
246. Id.
247. U.N. CHARTER art. 37(1).
248. Under article 51, see supra note 198, the dispute must still be brought to the
Security Council even though the United States has already exercised its right of collec-
tive self-defense against Nicaragua. Article 51 requires that those states exercising the
right of self-defense immediately report to the Security Council. The Security Council
has complete discretion to take any action it deems necessary to maintain or restore
international order.
249. U.N. CHARTER arts. 34 & 36.
the aggressor.250 If these measures prove inadequate, the Security
Council can take military action designed to maintain international
order by deploying the armed forces of member states.2 "
International Law Implications of the Actions of the United
States
In light of its recent actions in Nicaragua, the United States must
make some basic decisions concerning the role it is to play in the
world community. The choice is between pursuing policies designed
to support and defend international law, or violating that law by
flouting international principles such as the prohibition of the threat
or use of force.
The path the United States decides to pursue will have important
implications for the future of international law. As one of the leading
supporters of the effort to construct a viable legal order, the United
States is viewed as a role model for international behavior. Higher
standards are expected of the United States because of its preemi-
nent position in the international order. Violations by the United
States of the fundamental principles of international law are consid-
erably more harmful to the international order than are similar vio-
lations by other countries. The actions of the United States in Nica-
ragua diminish the respect and credibility of international law, and
its actions set a precedent for other countries to engage in similar
illegal conduct. The result is a decline in the effectiveness of interna-
tional law and a rise in the lawlessness of international society.
A substantial portion of international law is based on the treaty
system which exists between countries. Treaties allow states to set
the standards of behavior or conduct that they may employ in their
mutual relations. Treaties are reciprocal agreements between coun-
tries. Unlawful behavior is constrained by the theory that each coun-
try is prohibited from acting illegally toward the other. The violation
of a treaty obligation interjects uncertainty and mistrust into the in-
ternational system. John Stuart Mill wrote: "The rules of ordinary
international morality imply reciprocity. But the barbarians will not
reciprocate .... -252 Violations by the United States of its treaty ob-
ligations, and of the UN and OAS Charters, undermine the credibil-
ity of the structure of treaties governing international relations.
The actions of the United States also have grave implications for
international organizations such as the ICJ and the UN. Its decision
to boycott the ICJ proceedings on Nicaragua's application under-
mines the Court's effectiveness as a judicial forum for the peaceful
250. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
251. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
252. Gootieb, How to Rescue International Law, 50 COMMENTARY 46 (1984).
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resolution of international disputes. States will be less willing to util-
ize the ICJ as a method of settling disputes when it appears likely
that the opponent party will boycott the proceedings. Similarly, the
United States' actions conflict with the fundamental purpose of the
UN, which is to resolve international disputes in a peaceful manner.
The use of force by the United States is in direct contravention of
this principle. By not working within the framework of these interna-
tional organizations, the United States has contributed to the disre-
spect often accorded to international law. 253
CONCLUSION
From a Machiavellian perspective, the actions of the United
States in Nicaragua are a legitimate means of achieving a valid end.
From an international law perspective, however, the methods em-
ployed by the United States are in violation of international stan-
dards of behavior. Such conduct serves not only to tarnish the credi-
bility of international law, but also to diminish respect for the
United States in the international community.
KEITH T. SCHULZ
253. This Comment has not dealt with the legality of the United States' actions in
Nicaragua under domestic law. The United States' support of covert operations in Nica-
ragua raises questions in at least three areas. First, the United States' actions appear to
compromise the Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. 960 (1976), which prohibits United States
participation in military efforts against a country with which it is at peace. Second, the
Boland amendment, part of the 1983 Fiscal Appropriations Act, prohibits the use of
funds to support military activities designed to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.
Pub. L. No. 97-377 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). Third, covert funding of contra forces
raises the issue of the scope of presidential power under the War Powers Act to authorize
military actions without the consent of Congress.

